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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 13-3957
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MICHAEL MORRIS,
Appellant
______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Crim. No. 1-12-cr-00268-003)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 12, 2014
____________
Before: AMBRO and BARRY, Circuit Judges, and
RESTANI,* Judge
(Opinion Filed: June 20, 2014)
____________
OPINION
____________
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Michael Morris was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and distribution of

*

The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of International Trade,
sitting by designation.

cocaine. The jury found that each of Morris’ offenses involved 28 grams or more, but
less than 280 grams, of cocaine base, commonly referred to as crack cocaine. After the
jury was dismissed, Morris filed a motion to correct the verdict, arguing that the jury had
erred in entering its findings as to weight. The District Court denied the motion. We will
affirm.
I.
Morris and a co-defendant, Dawan Maynard, were indicted and tried on two
counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute powder cocaine and crack cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846, and (2) distribution and possession with the intent to distribute powder
cocaine and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. The charges arose from the
following incidents. According to the evidence at trial, Maynard and Morris arranged
four drug sales, two in 2010 and two in 2012, to individuals who turned out to be
confidential police informants. Morris made the actual drug hand-offs in both of the
2012 sales, and those transactions involved powder cocaine only. Police also found two
plastic baggies of powder cocaine on Morris at the time of his arrest in August 2012.
The jury convicted Morris and Maynard on both counts. The verdict form
contained a special interrogatory for each charged offense. With respect to each count,
upon a finding of guilty, the jury was tasked with determining the weight of the crack
cocaine, if any, involved in the offense. The jury found that Morris had conspired to
distribute and had actually distributed, or possessed with the intent to distribute, 28
grams or more, but less than 280 grams, of crack cocaine. It also found that Maynard had
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conspired to distribute 28 grams or more, but less than 280 grams, of crack cocaine, but
that, unlike Morris, he had distributed less than 28 grams of that drug. After the
foreperson announced and the other jurors confirmed their agreement with the verdict,
Morris asked the District Court to ask the jury whether the drug weights, as found,
included crack cocaine or powder cocaine. The Court deemed it inappropriate to inquire
further into the jury’s decision, and denied the request. The jury was then dismissed.
Later that day, one of the jurors informed the District Court that, when making its
weight determination with respect to the distribution charge, the jury considered the
amount of both powder cocaine and crack cocaine. The Court promptly informed
counsel of the juror’s statement. Morris moved to correct the verdict, arguing that the
jury had plainly made a mistake when responding to the special interrogatories. He asked
that the Court recall the jury and investigate the reported mistake to ascertain whether it
was a mere transcription error made when completing the verdict form.
The District Court denied the motion. It found that the juror’s statement suggested
no clerical—and correctable—error regarding the manner in which the verdict was
entered on the form. Rather, any error related to the jury’s understanding and application
of the Court’s instructions to the facts of the case. The Court found that it had no
authority to probe the jury’s mental processes or correct a verdict based on evidence of
such an error. Morris timely appealed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have
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jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review the denial of a motion to inquire into a jury’s deliberations for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). A district court
abuses its discretion by making an error of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
III.
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits district courts, when inquiring into the
validity of a verdict, from receiving juror testimony relating to statements made during
deliberations or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict. The Rule does,
however, permit a juror to testify about whether “a mistake was made in entering the
verdict on the verdict form.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(2)(C); see, e.g., Karl v. Burlington N.
R.R. Co., 880 F.2d 68, 74 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that Rule 606(b) permits a court to
assess whether the verdict announced was the result of a “clerical error”—such as “one
where the foreperson wrote down, in response to an interrogatory, a damage amount
different from that agreed upon by the jury”—but not an erroneous interpretation of the
court’s instructions).
Although our review is hampered by the fact that the conversation between the
juror and the District Court was not on the record, the juror’s statement, as recounted by
Morris and the Court, does not suggest that the verdict contained a transcription error or
inaccurately reflected the will of the jury. The juror simply reported that the jury
included both cocaine powder and crack cocaine when determining the weight of drugs
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distributed by Morris. This was error, as the special interrogatory directed the jury to
find the weight of crack cocaine alone.1 The error, however, was a mistake in the jury’s
understanding of the Court’s instructions and how the special interrogatory should be
answered. Rule 606(b) barred the Court from receiving such evidence, which pertained
to the jurors’ thought process, or relying on that evidence as a basis for amending the
verdict. The Court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion when it refused to recall the
jury for an evidentiary hearing into how it arrived at its determination of the weight of
drugs involved in those counts on which it found Morris guilty.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.

1

Indeed, the disparity in the weight of crack cocaine found to have been distributed by
Morris and by Maynard appears to be the result of the jury’s erroneous consideration of
powder cocaine, which Morris, but not Maynard, physically possessed and distributed.
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